Jay Heisler, Independent Canadian Journalist
Adam P. MacDonald (LinkedIn Profile) is a former naval warfare officer in the Royal Canadian Navy, having served with both the regular and reserve forces. A Killam Scholar, he obtained his Ph.D. in political science from Dalhousie University in 2023. He also holds an M.A. from the University of Victoria and a B.A. from the Royal Military College of Canada. His research interests include American hegemony, strategic rivalry between the United States and China, naval policy and strategy and the geopolitical and economic environments defining the Indo-Pacific and Arctic regions. His work has been published in a number of academic journals, including Asian Affairs: An American Review, the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, the Canadian Military Journal, International Journal and the Journal for Military and Strategic Studies; he has also contributed to several edited book volumes. Recently, he has worked in both Global Affairs Canada and the Department of National Defence, largely conducting research and analysis on China and its impacts on Canadian defence and foreign policy.
For starters, what is cognitive warfare?
Cognitive warfare falls under – but usually is seen as distinct from other elements/tactics listed in – the domain of information or public opinion warfare which focuses on an adversary or competitor trying to alter the individual and collective perceptions and beliefs of a targeted population in order to further their interests which usually stand in opposition and/or come at the detriment of those held by the targeted population. In particular, cognitive warfare is more about how people think – the dominant paradigms in which information is collection, absorbed and acted upon – rather than what people think. Cognitive warfare usually involves prepping a targeted population in a way which enables the movement of ideas/actions/views previously seen as unacceptable or fringe into the mainstream as acceptable, important, and worthy of focus and consideration.
I think cognitive warfare is largely about facilitating a highly reactive and emotional mental state in target populations, as opposed to some sort of approach which tries to use logic and rationality to demonstrate why one view/action is better than another. In the current era, my sense is cognitive warfare is used by adversaries to make targeted countries’ population highly suspicious and paranoid about their domestic politics, especially the motivations and actions of governments, institutions, and their fellow citizens. In this vein, much of the cognitive warfare efforts by adversarial actors are largely designed to bred mistrust and hostility within targeted populations, creating division and tension which inhibits the ability of a society to act with a common purpose and allocate resources for their defence and prosperity against mutually agreed upon threats and challenges. Cognitive warfare, therefore, is not simply propaganda in the sense of an actor trying to mobilize support for their views/desire actions, and deter targeted sides from opposing these, but usually is meant to sow internal division, amplifying issues and angles which make constituents of that targeted population look inward with suspicion, usually with the ideal goal of making citizens in the targeted state/community believe their greatest threats are not external but in their own community and/or government.
What are some cognitive warfare techniques?
Social media and other open-source communication systems are ideal platforms to conduct and further cognitive warfare, especially given the purposeful addiction driven algorithmic designs of many of these apps and products which are poorly governed, by governments and the companies themselves. Furthermore, advancements in AI, especially textual, audio and visual (images and videos) are and will increasingly be used in cognitive warfare efforts. Lack of regulation around AI produced content (due to a number of factors including fears of giving an advantage to a competitor without such regulation – a common fear espoused by American tech firms and some in the political class about China – and in general being behind the technological curve of this technology which many of its proponents argue will transform the economy and way we live) could easily flood targeted populations with AI generated content with explicit and implicit messaging. One really concerning aspect is the growing difficulty in discerning real from AI generated content, including historical events and footage. Such technologies, especially the visual/video element, could really alter how people think of themselves, their societies, and others in a way which is designed to marginalize their interests to and/or transform them into ones which enablers those of the attacker. Indeed, I wouldn’t be surprised if cognitive warfare actors in Russia, China, North Korea and elsewhere are amplifying the concerns about AI and data centres in order to slow down their development and implementation in Western states. Here, these actors have not generated this concern out of nowhere but are amplifying certain messages and concerns already present in these societies to hinder this power resource development. This does not mean that the baseline concerns around these issues are valid or not, but it speaks to the importance of attribution and motivation issues about who is furthering these messages and why.
Another big enabler of cognitive warfare is the rise of dark money, including crypto and other untraceable financial instruments which, like AI, are poorly regulated. The use of dark money enables and furthers the accumulation of monetary assets which can be further deployed into cognitive warfare pursuits by actors which exist in shadowy parts already.
How does one gauge cognitive warfare?
Determining level of impact from cognitive warfare is hard to discern for two main reasons: 1) determining the ‘who’ and their motivations in these regards given much of this work is done by actors/agents which are clandestine and do not want to be directly associated with a specific state or regime (and vice versa); and 2) even if there are changes observed which may indicate an actor’s cognitive warfare approach is working, it hard to determine if this can be attributed to them or are other factors (like general shifts in mood by a population) as the real, primary cause.
I think a very interesting case is cognitive warfare against Taiwan by Chinese entities, many tied indirectly and authorized by the central government. Beijing wants to create an impression to Taiwan’s population that independence is not possible, and reunification is not just inevitable but a good thing for them. Another message Beijing wants to send – both directly through policy and positions and indirectly through cognitive warfare techniques – is for others, especially the US, to not get involved and stop being in the way of reunification. This balance of messages leads to a number of actions being taken to various audiences, including casting doubt in the population about the Taiwanese government’s plans and motivations, the credibility of the US to protect them, and the indivisibly of the Chinese nation and people. So far, these actions have not produced the desired result internally in Taiwan or in its relations with the US. The vast majority of Taiwanese see themselves as a distinct and separate people, society and state which is unwilling to join China. At the same time, a number of other elements seem to compliment China’s goals including growing concerns about declaring independence and doubts about the American defence commitment credibility; though again some of this may be attributed to other reasons such as the Trump Administrations current approach to Taiwan, including the willingness to use arms sales and pressure Taiwanese chip investment in the US to further advantages with relations with Beijing and shore up domestic policies, which seem to come at the expense of being a credible partner ready and able to defend Taiwan. Taiwan, furthermore, continues to be marginalized internationally, with a very small group of states formally recognizing it officially. This case also shows that cognitive warfare is not only about the larger population but can be focused on elites as well. A major focus in this regard can be on convincing foreign leaders/elites, through mechanisms which speak to them, about either one’s benign intentions and/or the futility of trying to oppose them on an issue such which is more important to them than the US and the American public. Russian cognitive warfare designed to undermine Western support for Ukraine follows this dual approach of targeting the general population and elites.
What are some ways to help mitigate the effects of cognitive warfare?
In terms of remedial actions, I think a mixture of education and regulation is desperately needed. On the regulation front, getting rid of bots on social media is really important in order to generate attribution for users and content creators. AI produced products need to be explicitly stated as such – being artistic work rather than actual fact. Alongside this, educating the public about developing critical thinking skills, algorithmic based models of social media sites, and cyber hygiene is really important. I think many feel they are being critical already but actually are largely just opening their apertures of belief towards more conspiratorial stories which go against actors like governments and institutions which they were already somewhat suspicious of. Skills such as thinking about attribution, content creation, and how this content is being produced and amplified are really important to build a resilient society. Also, getting off the social media universe and living in the real world – interacting with people in the community – will help lessen the hold of these modalities of interaction which usually produce dynamics which keep people separated into their own tribes which are exclusionary and hostile/suspicious towards others. Governments need to be transparent about decision-making, foster a sense of community/nationhood (though being mindful than further developing a critical skilled population will mean these skills will be used towards what they are trying to further in the society in terms of history, identity, and purpose) and raise examples of cognitive warfare efforts by malign actors, including foreign interference techniques though legal and classification issues may restrict the use of specific examples. OSINT researchers also play a critical role in helping illuminate malign actors and their strategies, specifically conducting tracing work to show attribution, motivation, history of similar behavior, and the techniques used, including how these have evolved over time. This is really complicated, messy work which requires deep analytical and usually coding/software skills, but it is vitally important in protecting society against efforts, especially by outside actors, to further division, harm and discord in a targeted population for their own purposes. Oddly enough, I think AI may be able to help with these efforts given its processing capabilities as well as helping simplify key takeaways for a layperson audience.
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